Skip to main content

The Populist and the Party Man

Image: Gage Skidmore
It has been an eventful two months at the Donald Trump White House. Questions about Russian involvement in the election have dogged the administration. The long-promised travel ban was announced and then swiftly struck down in court. Then a revised travel ban was unveiled, only to be defeated with even more alacrity. And, of course, the Tweeter-in-Chief continues to fire 140-character salvos online. 

With all the headline-grabbing theatrics, it is not difficult to ignore some of the more fundamental and long-term issues that the Trump administration faces. Among these is the tension inherent in the administration’s economy policy proposals. 

Trump was elected as a populist insurgent, riding on a wave of primarily white, working class discontent with a global economic order that has largely left them worse off. He found assistance in Democratic base as many doubted the depth of Hillary Clinton’s commitment to left-wing economic policy, seeing her as beholden to Wall Street interests; the transcripts of her highly-paid speeches to Goldman Sachs were as coveted (and elusive) as Donald Trump’s tax returns.

The issue for Trump is that he comes into power as a Republican with a Republican majority—the Grand Old Party has always espoused economic conservatism and is infamous for its cosiness with Wall Street and big business. 

Indeed, stock markets have been on a tear following the election, with the Dow Jones Index surpassing all time highs. Much of this rally is built on expectations of business friendly measures. Corporations are expecting lower taxes and banking stocks, in particular, have benefitted from Trump’s vow to dismantle aspects of the Dodd-Frank regulations enacted after the financial crisis. These are not things your average Trump supporter is cheering for.  

The most glaring contradiction is between Trump’s and his supporter’s views on free trade and those of the Republican party. The American right wing staunchly supports free trade and the opening of borders to the flow of goods. Anti-globalisation rhetoric is something one would more expect from Bernie Sanders and his ilk on the left wing of the Democratic Party. The Democrats have traditionally been seen as the party of the working class, a role the Republican Party is now somewhat uneasily being forced to adopt. 

It remains unclear whether the Republican Party will ultimately support Trump in his crusade against the current global trade regime. Many of the party’s legislators have spent their entire political careers trying to push freer trade, and are personally invested in creating a more globalised world. Needless to say, however, the implementation of more closed trade policy is a nonnegotiable demand of Trump supporters. 

The Dodd-Frank reforms put in place to regulate Wall Street following the Great Recession are another potential sticking point. Much to the jubilation of investment bankers, Trump has clearly stated his intention to make the rules less rigorous. Loosening government regulation is a long-term goal of the Republican Party, but kowtowing to Wall Street interests would be anathema to the vast majority of Trump supporters. 

Gutting the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a key plank of Trump’s campaign. Happily for him, this is a goal that was shared by the Republican Party and his core supporters alike—unlike sweeteners to Wall Street, for example. The Republican’s proposed replacement bill for the ACA will, however, likely result in 20 million Americans losing health insurance coverage. 

Ideologically, the Republican party has few qualms regarding the ramifications of its bill: their stance is that the government should have no role at all in health insurance. But how will those working class Americans who turned up at the polls for Donald Trump react once they realise the very personal consequences of losing low-cost coverage? 

These are but a few of the conflicts that could emerge within the economic policy of this administration. Which path economic legislation will follow is still very unpredictable. What would be best for America? That is a complex question to be addressed another time. But what is predictable is a deeper, more serious rift between Donald Trump’s supporters and the Republican establishment—or a wholesale transformation of the Party’s ideological standing. Either way, what happens these next four years will leave a mark for a long time to come. 

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Harmony in the Middle Kingdom

Image: Wikimedia Commons The four decades since Deng Xiaoping spearheaded “Reform and Opening Up” in China have seen growth on a scale unparalleled in modern history. Where hundreds of millions were once destitute, extreme poverty has been all but cast into the annals of history; the world competes to attract the wealth of China’s burgeoning middle and upper classes. Analyses of the country's explosive growth are aplenty. Real GDP has grown 64-fold, literacy is above 95%, and in a once Communist country the private sector, at least on paper, now accounts for 60 percent of economic activity. This piece, however, will look more at the stability of the country—while analysing potential economic factors underpinning this. A number of scholars predicted political and economic instability in China as nation rapidly became prosperous. Yet, in a country transformed, political and economic durability remain. The Chinese Community Party continues to enjoy high levels of popular leg...

On Myanmar

This is adapted from a paper I wrote for my Comparative Politics class at Harvard . A Friendless People Thousands have been killed. Hundreds of thousands have fled. They are a people without a home, much less a state. Such is the plight of the Rohingya, whom a UN spokesperson once called the most friendless people in the world. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has called the situation a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (“UN”). This latest wave of state-sponsored violence follows a series of attacks by militants—a small insurgent group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)—in August on Myanmarese military outposts. The brutal military crackdown is ostensibly targeted at insurgents. Yet, it is unmistakably civilians who are bearing the brunt of the violence, with the UN High Commissioner calling the response “clearly disproportionate” and “without regard for basic principles of international law” (“UN”). The approach of ethnic institutionalism...

Will the Tiger Roar?

Image: Wikimedia Commons Established as East Pakistan after India’s independence and partition, Bangladesh’s two decades prior to independence were marked by neglect and discrimination. Of the two parts of Pakistan, the East was more populous, but it remained politically and economically dominated by West Pakistan. Over 1,600km of Indian territory separated the two Pakistans. Liberation activists charged that the central government in West Pakistan engaged in the ethnolinguistic discrimination against the majority Bengali East Pakistanis. Only the West Pakistani native tongue, Urdu, was recognised as an official language in the, and Bengalis were also largely underrepresented in the Pakistani bureaucracy and army. Economically, the government of West Pakistan was accused of appropriating surpluses from the East to fund the West’s imports, and the West withheld the allocation of funds for development in the East.   As maltreatment and mismanagement grew, calls for freedom ...